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Abstract – This paper aims at discussing some facets of the emerging European level of collec-
tive negotiations. The paper argues that in general the acquis communautaire and other interna-
tional acts can already accommodate this new category of agreements. At the same time it finds 
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Introduction1
Over a decade after the entry into force of Directive 94/45/EC, European Works 
Councils (EWCs) are a well established dimension of European industrial relations 
and have become the most deeply rooted instrument of transnational employee repre-
sentation. With some 830 (EWC Database of ETUI-REHS, 2007) EWCs currently in 
active operation, they are by far the most numerous supranational forum for transna-
tional dialogue at the enterprise level, contributing actively to the development and 
reinforcement of the European Social Model. Their emergence in the 1980s in the 
form of the French comité de groupe led to the adoption of the EU-wide legal framework 
in 1994, setting the path for other multinational companies and their employees. In 
consequence of this unprecedented experiment in introducing elements of democracy 
into a workplace on the Community level and into the practice of corporate govern-
ance, information and consultation rights for employees in multinational companies 
are now an intrinsic feature of the economic reality of the EU. The fruits of the posi-
tive experience with specific bodies dedicated to safeguarding employee rights of in-
formation and consultation in an enterprise include further directives strengthening 
this entitlement on various levels: on the national level, by introducing works councils 
at plant level (Directive 2002/14/EC); at the transnational level in the form of works 
councils and board-level representation, embodied by non-executive employee direc-
tors in Supervisory Board (e.g. MAN Diesel SE, Allianz SE, Strabag SE), in a Societas
Europea (SE); again, securing an organized structure for information and consultation 
rights at the transnational level in a European Cooperative Society (SCE). Even 
though workers’ rights to information and consultation, or even co-management on 
board level in SEs, are currently secured in many provisions of the acquis communautaire,
it is EWCs that have accumulated the most experience of all. 
Development of transnational collective negotiations in Europe as a 
functional development of EWC performance 
Indeed, there are currently 406 active EWCs (ca. 50% of all active EWCs) which have 
a record going back ten years or more. This signifies a collective experience and exper-
tise of EWC members participating in these bodies, EWC coordinators from Euro-
pean Industry Federations (EIFs) assisting them, and trade union officers supporting 
their work. These 406 EWCs represent a powerful potential developed over years in 
many challenging situations such as restructuring, collective redundancies, mergers 
and take-overs. Obviously, not all EWCs live up to the reality and challenges of the 
contemporary economy ridden by intense globalisation and transnational competition 
that lead to severe and constant cost-saving, restructuring and social-dumping with 
serious implications for the employees of the companies facing these phenomena.  
                                                          
1  This paper represents reworked version of an article first presented during a conference 
„Perspectives of employee participation in Poland in conditions of EU membership“ 
(Perspektywy rozwoju partycypacji pracowniczej w warunkach Unii Europejskiej) in ?ód?
(Poland), 23-24.04.2007, published in a book by Prof. Stanis?aw Rudolf „Perspektywy 
rozwoju partycypacji pracowniczej w warunkach Unii Europejskiej“, University of ?ód?,
2007.
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Traces of such an understanding of the knowledge-based economy are not un-
common nowadays, which is reflected also in the EWC practice. A recent survey, 
conducted by Professor Jeremy Waddington (ETUI-REHS)2 among more than 400 
EWC members coming from 24 countries and sitting in more than 200 EWCs, shows 
that information and consultation are a rare luxury enjoyed by no more than 28.1% of 
EWCs; the very basic right to information was reported to be satisfied in some 44.5% 
of cases. This information shows that many EWCs do not live up to the expectation 
of EU legislators, who, already in 1994, recognised transnationalization and restructur-
ing as the most powerful factors shaping economic reality in the years to come and, 
who anticipated that “if economic activities are to develop in a harmonious fashion undertakings 
operating in two or more Member States must inform and consult the representatives of the affected 
employees”.3
The other side of the coin is, however, that there are also numerous companies 
which do allow for information and consultation of employees and accept the active 
role that EWCs aspire to undertake. In such entities the efficient performance of 
EWCs is, on the one hand, a result of adoption of a modern system of corporate gov-
ernance that supports or, at least, accepts employee involvement in the handling of 
change and restructuring. In these enterprises employee representatives are recognised 
as stakeholders having a direct interest in a company’s good performance and as 
counsellors, whose expertise and contribution can be profitable for the management 
in terms of shaping restructuring in a socially responsible way. On the other hand, 
such positive cases of efficacious functioning of EWCs stem from the many years of 
experience they have managed to accumulate. Active functioning for a decade or more 
not only gained the EWCs, as collective bodies, broad knowledge and experience, but 
also enabled them to acquire the confidence indispensable in demanding information, 
expressing opinions or negotiating with company management. This potential coin-
cided partially with – and, on the other hand, derived from – economic challenges 
ranging from transnational mergers and acquisitions, restructuring processes, intensi-
fied operation of businesses on an international scale, increased mobility of produc-
tion factors, as well as development of CSR. 
Due to the various characters of the challenges that fuelled the advance of capaci-
ties of EWCs towards bargaining partners, the characteristics of the agreements 
(co)signed by the EWCs are assorted. By this token, some researchers, on a general 
level, categorise the various transnational texts in question as CSR-type accords, re-
structuring agreements and joint texts referring to various employee rights (Carley/ 
Hall 2006: 34-35). 
Transnational collective agreements – some facts and figures 
A result of this accretion of experience combined with economic factors are approxi-
mately 95 joint texts signed in some 60 multinational companies, dealing with certain 
issues of transnational work organisation on the company level. I deliberately did not 
                                                          
2  Results of the survey “Cross-border Networks of Worker’s Participation in Transnational 
Enterprises” completed by Waddington (2005).  
3  Preamble to the Directive 94/45/EC, Consideration no. 10. 
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use the term ‘transnational collective bargaining’ (TCB) here, since it causes some 
political controversy among the various actors concerned by this matter. The most 
neutral terms for this kind of document are transnational agreements, or transnational texts, 
or transnational negotiations, or joint texts. The common denominator of these names is 
the fact that their users avoid referring to collective bargaining in its transnational dimen-
sion, as this would presuppose that collective bargaining is no longer an exclusively 
national issue, but has been moved up to the supranational European level. The con-
sequences of adopting such a view – or, at least, of agreeing to use TCB as a valid 
term – are somewhat remarkable and will be discussed later in this paper. 
The aforementioned 95 texts were, in the majority of cases, signed at big multina-
tional companies, employing high numbers of staff, active in many countries and 
headquartered predominantly in France, Germany, the Nordic countries or the US. 
We have observed their proliferation since approximately 2000, although some were 
signed in the 1990s. For the most part, the agreements were concluded in the metal, 
food and drinks, chemical and construction and woodwork sectors (in the latter sector 
the majority of them have a global scope). The joint texts in question have both a 
global and a European (EU) scope. The range of issues covered encompasses subjects 
such as (items listed in order of the share of agreements in which a provision on a 
given topic appears): fundamental rights (CSR), trade union rights, health and safety, 
equal opportunities, training skills, wages, social dialogue, working time, subcontract-
ing, environment, restructuring, and other (Pichot 2006). In some two thirds of cases 
they were co-signed by both an EWC and an international/European trade union 
organisation (e.g. European Industry Federation, EIF), whereas only in some 20% of 
cases were such joint texts signed by national trade unions. The range of multinational 
firms that have engaged in collective negotiations on the transnational level and signed 
agreements of the type described comprises major international players like: GM, 
Ford, Danone, Diageo on restructuring; Arcelor, ENI, Lafarge, Vivendi on health and 
safety issues; Total, Deutsche Bank, Air France, Dexia on employment, training and 
mobility; Unilever, GEA, Philip Morris on data protection; Volkswagen, Rhodia, Suez, 
Club Med, Daimler Chrysler on fundamental rights (Corporate Social Responsibility, 
CSR).
Legal capacity of acquis communautaire to accommodate transnational 
collective negotiations 
It is obvious at first glance that the issues covered by these transnational agreements 
are wide-ranging, while the scope of their application is restricted to certain specific 
aspects of working conditions. Thus the remark that they are still far from having 
achieved the status of collective labour agreements signed at national level is, to a 
certain extent, apt here. At the same time, looking at supranational, European institu-
tions and structures through national glasses often leads to confusion and can be mis-
leading. The European system is not a simple copy of national reality; it is governed 
by its own supranational rules, so that the EU is, much more, a structure sui generis. 
Thus, national measures, ideas and concepts may well be inappropriate if used as 
gauges for European ones. 
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Being aware of these differences, although useful in analysing the issue, does not 
resolve it. At this stage the question whether those agreements are indeed linked to 
collective bargaining, and if yes, what is the character of this link, naturally arises. On 
the one hand, the specific areas referred to and regulated in these joint texts do un-
doubtedly represent fragments of the coverage of collective bargaining on the national 
level. What is more, they do meet the criteria of collective bargaining as defined by the 
International Labour Organisation: “Voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' 
organizations and workers' organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by collective agreements.”4 This ‘voluntary negotiation’ indeed took place in the 
case of some of the abovementioned agreements. It was voluntary in the sense that 
there is no legal obligation or general framework for such negotiations on the Euro-
pean level within a company. Similar negotiations on the European level are known 
only on a sectoral or inter-sectoral basis in the context of the European social dia-
logue. In search of an answer to the question of whether the transnational agreements 
signed in some companies by EWCs can be labelled collective agreements, one can 
again resort to ILO conventions and recommendations. In Collective Agreements 
Recommendation, 1951 ILO defines collective agreements as “all agreements in writing 
regarding working conditions and terms of employment concluded between an employer, a group of 
employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more representative 
workers' organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly 
elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and regulations, on the other.”5 This 
definition, while useful and adopted by a commonly acknowledged organisation, is, 
first of all, rather general and, secondly, implemented on a global, supra-European 
level. Both these features make it vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that views 
presented by ILO do not refer precisely enough to the latest developments in Euro-
pean industrial relations. Following this indication, one may set out on a quest for 
specific EU provisions. The first relevant source would be Art. 12 of the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers but, unfortunately, it does not 
provide a more precise definition of collective bargaining, apart from mentioning that 
such a ‘dialogue between the two sides of industry at European level’ may ‘result in 
contractual relations in particular at inter-occupational and sectoral level’. Neither 
does one find a satisfactory legal basis in the Art. 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights which, in regard to the right to negotiate and conclude collective agree-
ments, stipulates that “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accor-
dance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collec-
tive agreements at the appropriate levels (…).” Nonetheless, the mention of an appropriate 
level for conclusion of collective agreements may be a sufficient legal basis for the 
emergence of the European level of collective bargaining, if social partners deem this 
dimension necessary and apposite to fit the economic reality. Such an interpretation is 
found also in the Explanations of the European Convention on the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights6: “The reference to appropriate levels refers to the levels laid down by Union 
                                                          
4  The ILO Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), 1949. 
5  Section II, Article 2 Collective Agreements Recommendation (No. 41), 1951. 
6  See: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00828-re01en03.pdf. 
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law or by national laws and practices, which might include the European level when Union legislation 
so provides.”. This opinion shows that Art. 28, once the Constitutional Treaty is 
adopted, might indeed be considered a sufficient legal basis for adopting a framework 
for transnational collective negotiations in the EU. This capacity of Art. 28 is, in my 
view, not lessened by the indication included in the Explanations of the European 
Convention that this level of collective bargaining might emerge if ‘Union legislation so 
provides’. This is too a narrow interpretation, as the very wording of Art. 28 makes a 
direct reference not only to Community and national law, but also to practice. Since 
the latter has already taken the form of transnational agreements, which, by the way, 
are in line with international norms set by the ILO, one can arrive at the conclusion 
that this expansion of collective bargaining can already be accommodated within the 
current acquis communautaire. A corroboration of this view may be found also in Art. 
139 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing The European Commu-
nity7 (ECT) which clearly stipulates: “Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue 
between them at Community level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements”. Another
example of an already binding legal basis in which to embed transnational negotiations 
on an element of collective agreements would be the Working Time Directive8, which 
in a sense encourages social partners to negotiate working time on a sectoral basis. 
Summing up, it may be established that transnational collective negotiations are al-
ready possible within the current legal frames of general (EC Treaty, EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Charter of Social Rights) and specific (directives) acts of the 
Community law. 
Establishing that there is legal capacity in the current legislation on the EU level 
does not, however, mean that all criticism of the concept of transnational collective 
bargaining is overruled. Some participants in this debate claim that the recently signed 
transnational agreements can hardly, given their scope and the actors involved, be 
compared with national collective agreements. Yet such argument is of only limited 
value for the discussion since it ignores the fact that there is nothing like a uniform 
standard of collective bargaining in the EU. Each member state has its own traditions 
of collective negotiations which differ in respect to the level on which parties bargain 
collectively (national, sectoral, inter-sectoral, individual works), parties and actors (tri-
partite or bipartite, trade unions, works councils), scope (parties to the contract only, 
all employers and employees) and content of collective agreements, binding force of 
collective agreements, etc.9 Of course, since the 1990s, trade unions and their organi-
zations have been developing coordination of European collective bargaining, albeit 
via a different approach aimed at synchronization of national collective bargaining 
policies as well as at elaborating common viewpoints (Clauwaert et al. 2004). Coordi-
nation of collective bargaining is thus oriented more to introducing the European 
dimension into the local, regional and national level of bargaining (Clauwaert/ 
                                                          
7  C 352/33, 24.12.2002. 
8  Council Directive No. 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of 
the organisation of working time. See e.g. Art. 2 and Art. 15. 
9  For more details on differences in national collective bargaining systems see Keune (2006, 
2004).
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Warneck 2006). Despite the difference in approach, the coordination of collective 
negotiations on the European level might be a good point of departure for the emer-
gence of their EU-wide echelon. 
Stepping down from the treaty level to EU directives one finds some further 
hints regarding transnational collective negotiations. Directive on collective redundan-
cies 98/59/EC, business transfer 2001/23/EC and framework directive on informa-
tion and consultation 2002/14/EC all provide for information and consultation for 
employees in cases of company restructuring. Most importantly, they stipulate that 
consultation should take place “at the relevant level of management and representation, depend-
ing on the subject under discussion”. Such a formulation seems to open a gate to transna-
tional negotiations processes and the European level shall be the most appropriate in a 
given situation. 
At this stage, it seems useful to summarize the above arguments and draw some 
conclusions. Taking account of the arguments developed above, it becomes clear that 
the said accords co-signed by EWCs represent a form of transnational collective 
agreements. This thesis is based on the above conducted analysis of the following 
aspects of the new transnational collective agreements in comparison to their ‘classi-
cal’ form. From this evaluation the following inferences can be drawn: 
a) in terms of matter and content of those joint texts regulating core employee rights 
and working conditions the substantive agreements resemble collective agree-
ments of traditional type. The level of exactitude might still be different, the na-
tional collective accords going more in depth and regulating certain issues more 
precisely, though the similarity remains untarnished. The core difference, how-
ever, is that the core of national collective agreements remain working-time and 
wages, whereas this is still not the case of transnational collective agreements; 
b) the collective quality of the transnational agreements is identical with the one that 
their national counterparts have: both regulate rights, working conditions, etc. of a 
generally identified group of employees, who by the mere fact of being employed 
in a given company are covered by those agreements. It is not important, whether 
this collective quality of an agreement is based upon the fact of being employed in 
a company (predominantly transnational agreements) or in a branch of national 
industry (on national level collective agreements are in some countries concluded 
mainly on the sectoral level; however, on the European level we also observe the 
sectoral social dialogue that has been functioning and developing for years now, 
and which can be viewed as a harbinger of the company level of transnational col-
lective bargaining); 
c) as regards conformity with assorted international legal regulations referring to 
labour market, industrial relations and corporate governance such as acts of ILO 
or the acquis communautaire of the EU, it has been argued that they do include space 
(or at least do not exclude the possibility of) for accommodating, without any ma-
jor adjustments, transnational collective negotiations. This statement, however, 
states only that the condition sine qua non has been fulfilled and does not mean 
that the regulatory framework is sufficient. In other words, the transnational col-
lective agreements are a legal category that is not contrary to any regulation and is 
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not explicitly excluded by any act. At the same time, precise regulations describing 
the functioning, binding force, judicial resort, etc. are not sufficiently developed. 
Pursuing the review of legal sources including mentions of capacities for European 
collective bargaining, one finally arrives at the EWC Directive 94/45/EC. This act 
guarantees employees’ representatives the right to information and consultation, de-
fined as an exchange of views, on the level of transnational enterprises. At this point 
one probably reaches the core of the question, namely, whether this EU act is a suffi-
cient basis for EWCs to engage in transnational negotiations or whether they are al-
ready trespassing by exceeding the mandate originally given to them by the European 
legislator. On the one hand, Directive 94/45 sets no limits on the negotiating powers 
of EWCs, while on the other hand defining them clearly as bodies or procedures for 
information and consultation and thereby somewhat restraining the scope of their 
functioning. At the same time, the European legislator does not set clear boundaries 
on the consultation competence of EWCs. Arguably, the management and EWCs 
might opt for consultation leading to conclusion of binding agreements concerning 
working conditions.  
This competence of EWCs and management to conduct consultations whose ef-
fect is embodied in collective agreements is, nonetheless, inferred and not explicit. As 
can be deduced from the above argumentation, even though it may be argued that 
collective bargaining on a European level can be fitted into the current legal system of 
acquis communautaire, it is clear that there is currently no single act at hand to regulate 
this issue. For this reason, a study group including renowned researchers in European 
industrial relations was commissioned in 2005 by the European Commission DG for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunity to prepare an analysis and as-
sessment of the possibility of introducing an optional legal framework for transna-
tional collective bargaining (Ales et al. 2006). Legal grounds for such a proposal are 
the provisions of Art. 94 of the Treaty Establishing European Community (ECT; 
competence to issue laws necessary for the functioning of the internal market) and 
Art. 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Introduction of such an optional 
framework might also be anchored in Art. 137, paragraph 1 point (f) ECT stipulating 
the Community’s competence to support and complement the activities in the field of 
‘representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers including co-
determination, subject to paragraph 5’. Some adversaries of the concept of collective trans-
national bargaining argue, however, that the mentioned paragraph 5 of the same arti-
cle rules out the possibility of the Community legislator issuing laws in this field. The 
later reservation is, however, an excessive interpretation which, as the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) ruled in the Albany case10, is hardly defensible under the circum-
stances in the context of Art. 94 ECT. In concrete terms the ECJ’s verdict in the Al-
bany case means that Art. 137 (5) does not exclude the right of collective bargaining 
from the regulatory scope of the Community11. In any case, once the Constitutional 
                                                          
10  ECJ Case C-67/96 
11  “55. In that connection, Article 118 of the EC Treaty (numeration of ex Articles 117 to 
120 of the EC Treaty was changed into Articles 136 to 143 EC Treaty) provides that the 
Commission is to promote close cooperation between Member States in the social field, 
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Treaty is adopted the regulatory scope of Art. 137 (5) will be modified by Art.28 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides capacity for collective bar-
gaining on EU level. Nonetheless, possibly with the aim of avoiding any unnecessary 
polemics stemming from paragraph 5 of Art. 137 ECT, the abovementioned report of 
the study group indicates Art. 94 ECT as its legal basis rather than Art. 137 which is 
more specific and refers to social partners and their rights. Another reason for this 
choice might be the consideration that at the present time there is a more frequent 
tendency for the emergence of negative phenomena of competition between the 
Member States in terms of social standards. This kind of rivalry often leads to a 
downward spiral and replaces competition based on quality of products. In this way it 
may endanger or hamper a harmonious development of the common market and 
hence Community countermeasures may be more justified if anchored in Art. 94 
ECT, which has the function of safeguarding a coherent and sustainable functioning 
of the internal market. Nonetheless, in view of the above argument, it seems that cou-
pling a reference to the more general goals stipulated in Art. 94 with the specific in-
struments provided for by Art. 137 ECT would represent a more rational and coher-
ent approach. 
From the above analysis of the legal conditioning of the matter one undisputable 
inference can be drawn: currently all the transnational agreements signed by EWCs 
(and by other actors as well) are concluded without a legal framework. A consequence 
of being deprived of a proper legal anchoring is their legal ambiguity: they are neither 
against the law, nor in line with binding provisions. Seeking to characterise their exis-
tence in legal terms one could say that these accords subsist in parallel with the law. 
The corollary is a situation in which there are no means or procedures for a legal en-
forcement of these contracts, no possibility to seek legal redress or recourse to labour 
courts on an appropriate level, etc. Having stated that, one can legitimately ask 
whether, in view of this lack of a legal background, it is still justified to call these ac-
cords of assorted nature (declarations, joint texts, common positions, etc.) agree-
ments? Agreements assume an equal footing between the parties and their reciprocal 
obligations, whereas in case of the transnational joint texts it might occur that in a 
situation of conflict they could turn out to be unilateral declarations by management, 
signed out of sheer ‘generosity’ or the will to be perceived as a socially responsible 
employer. This is of course a worst-case scenario, yet it should not be deemed impos-
sible, especially if compliance with one of these agreements were about to entail sub-
stantial financial burdens for a company.  
In order to handle some of the questions mentioned above, it seems necessary to 
put some structure in terms of terminology and criteria applied to describe the phe-
nomenon of transnational collective negotiations. Hitherto, a lot of confusion was 
aroused due to the lack of agreement upon categories and terms used in the debate. 
Various actors, such as the European Commission, trade union organizations, Euro-
pean Industry Federations and researchers have been using diverse terms, which often 
                                                          
particularly in matters relating to the right of association and collective bargaining be-
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brought about confusion. In my view, for the sake of better understanding, it could be 
useful to differentiate between, on the one hand, ‘collective bargaining’, exercised 
traditionally by trade unions as organizations mandated and legitimated to perform 
this role, and, on the other hand, transnational collective agreements, discussed in this 
paper. It appears worthwhile to keep applying the term ‘(national) collective bargain-
ing’, since it represents a specific kind of agreements that have working time and 
wages at its core. On the other hand, since it seems rather distant that these two issues 
will become a subject of collective negotiations on transnational company level it 
seems useful to apply the term ‘transnational collective agreements’ to this category of 
texts. Such texts falling into the category of ‘transnational collective agreements’ must, 
however, represent real agreements in the legal sense, i.e. they must be accords be-
tween equally positioned partners that bind themselves contractually to respect the 
provisions agreed upon. The latter condition, in consequence, excludes documents 
such as codes of conduct, joint statements, CSR declarations, etc. that are unilaterally 
adopted by company management or that do not fulfill formal criteria of agreements. 
Furthermore, agreements are contracts produced as a result of negotiations. By this 
token, ‘negotiations’ should not be confused with ‘consultation’, which is currently 
defined by the EU legislation as an exchange of views. Arguably, and in line with the 
wording of EU Directives on employee participation, consultation capacity of em-
ployee representation bodies such as EWCs is not equal to bargaining competence 
and mandate to enter into binding collective contracts.  
      In conclusion, however, it needs to be mentioned that this line of argument is just 
a proposal of looking at the issue. In reality, after applying these criteria, it is possible 
that the scale of the phenomenon, i.e. the number of agreements which indeed fit the 
pattern of ‘transnational collective agreements’ will turn out to be much smaller than 
one assumes now. In my view, however, the fact of differentiation between national 
collective bargaining and transnational collective agreements neither invalididates the 
thesis that the latter represent a new, transnational counterpart of the former ones, 
nor does it diminish the significance of this development. Despite the fact that they 
are not identical in scope (which might obviously change in future) they both seem to 
follow the same pattern, though on various levels. 
The Commission’s initiative: report of a study group on TCB and  
proposal for an optional legal framework 
The European Commission, recognising this legal ambiguity, noticed the problem 
already back in 2004, when, in its communication ‘Partnership for change in an enlarged 
Europe’ (COM 2004) in the section ‘Preparing further developments’, it stated:  
‘In view of the growing number of new generation texts, the Commission considers there 
to be a need for a framework to help improve the consistency of the social dialogue out-
comes and to improve transparency.(…) Interest in and the importance of transnational 
collective bargaining has been increasing in recent years, particularly in response to global-
isation and economic and monetary union. EWCs are adopting a growing number of 
agreements within multinational companies which cover employees in several Member 
States. There is also a growing interest in cross-border agreements between social partners 
from geographically contiguous Member States, as well as agreements between the social 
partners in particular sectors covering more than one Member State. 
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Already then the Commission envisaged introduction of a proposal for the requisite 
legal structure and consultations on this subject with European social partners. For-
mally, the aim of development of an optional legal framework was included in the 
Social Agenda 2005-2010 one year later when the Communication on the Social Agenda 
(COM 2005) was announced. In this document the Commission argued that: 
‘Providing an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining at either enter-
prise level or sectoral level could support companies and sectors to handle challenges 
dealing with issues such as work organisation, employment, working conditions, training. 
It will give the social partners a basis for increasing their capacity to act at transnational 
level. It will provide an innovative tool to adapt to changing circumstances, and provide 
cost-effective transnational responses. Such an approach is firmly anchored in the part-
nership for change priority advocated by the Lisbon strategy.’ 
In the Commission’s view, introduction of a legal framework for transnational collec-
tive bargaining12 represents a further step towards completion of the common market. 
It is difficult not to agree with this reasoning. If one glances at provisions regulating 
various aspects of international operation of companies, their trans-border mergers, 
taxation, etc., and compares it with existing legislation regarding rights of workers in 
their transnational dimension, it becomes clear that there is some imbalance to the 
detriment of the latter at stake here. A reason for this might be the fact that at Euro-
pean level social aspects have long been regarded as residuals of policies of free com-
petition and free movement of economic subjects (Schoemann 2006: 299). It seems 
thus that the emergence of transnational collective agreements is a token of bringing 
employee strategies on par with business acting globally. Hence, arguably, it represents 
a natural consequence of globalisation and an obvious development in industrial rela-
tions.
As the Commission rightly observes in the Communication on Social Agenda 2005-
2010, the lack of such an option to negotiate collectively on transnational level could 
be an obstacle to achievement of the common market in its full scope. Additionally, it 
should be added that, in a mid-term perspective, adoption of such a framework could 
potentially contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Lisbon Strategy. With 
this information in the background, the Commission assigned a group of academics, 
led by professor E. Ales, the task of preparing a study on transnational collective bar-
gaining. Specific reasons and objectives for initiating this research into the matter were 
the following (Ales et al. 2006): 
? to provide a comprehensive overview of the current developments in transna-
tional collective bargaining in Europe and to identify the main trends; 
? to identify the practical and legal obstacles to the further development of transna-
tional collective bargaining; 
                                                          
12  The term ‘transnational collective bargaining’ is used here (and in further paragraphs 
discussing the European Commissions position) in line with the original terminology ap-
plied by the European Commission in the ‘Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe’, 2004 
and not in line with the postulate of differentiation between ‘(national) collective bargain-
ing’ and ‘transnational collective agreements’ formulated in this paper.  
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? to identify and suggest any actions that might be taken to overcome these obsta-
cles and promote and support further development in the field of transnational 
collective bargaining; 
? to provide the Commission with a sound knowledge basis to assess the need for 
the development of Community framework rules, complementing national collec-
tive bargaining and highlighting relevant aspects such rules would have to take 
into account. 
The study team entrusted with this task adopted a research method based on the 
analysis of instruments and experiences in the field of transnational dialogue on the 
sectoral and company level. Such an investigation was expected to deliver conclusions 
about whether a new legal framework for transnational collective bargaining was nec-
essary as a complementary level of collective negotiations at the European level. 
Firstly, an examination of the contemporary transnational tools at European level was 
carried out and, in this respect, the research team positively appraised the European 
sectoral dialogue. Secondly, a similar analysis was conducted in regard to transnational 
tools at corporate level, notably those deriving from the EWC and SE regulations. 
Concerning the second part, the study group arrived at the conclusion that the com-
pany echelon of the transnational instrumentarium reveals, alongside some strong 
points, considerable weaknesses. At the end of the analytical section of the report the 
research team inferred that there is a need for an institutional acknowledgement and 
development of a European level of transnational collective bargaining that would 
complement the tools currently available, such as European social dialogue and trans-
national dialogue within companies. The authors of the report rightly identified poten-
tial fields of conflict among actors affected by the transnational agreements so far 
concluded. On the one hand, EWCs, which were quite often involved in these collec-
tive negotiations and whose members often signed the final agreements, thereby go 
beyond the original function designed for them; from information and consultation 
bodies supposed to obtain information on a company’s performance and employment 
trends, they go on to undertake negotiations and codetermination functions on mat-
ters of skills and training, health and safety, equal opportunities, (vocational) training - 
topics that usually constitute the main issues for the European sectoral dialogue 
committees. Trade unions, on the other hand, often feel threatened in their traditional 
domain of employee representation by the enhancement of the EWCs’ areas of activ-
ity; at the same time, the legislator in the EWC Directive did not provide for any tools 
minimising the risk of a clash between the EWCs and trade unions, such as recogni-
tion of the role of the latter in the operation of EWCs. The research team was un-
doubtedly correct in recognising the possibility of overlap and even conflict between 
these two forms of employee representation; additionally, the aforementioned Euro-
pean social dialogue committees are also directly concerned by the developments. It is 
legitimate to expect that, since the transnational agreements are often signed on the 
occasion of restructuring processes or restructuring is their common theme, the po-
tential for their emergence will grow as restructuring intensifies further in the years to 
come. The plea for an optional legal framework introducing order and structure into 
the matter can be seen in this regard as an important remedy against possible rubs 
between the actors of the labour world. Moreover, adopting institutional frames for 
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such agreements could help develop their anticipatory character instead of a reactive 
approach in cases of restructuring, which dominates nowadays. 
Lacking legal framework for transnational collective negotiations –
a case for the European Court of Justice 
In the near future, we are probably not going to witness an EU legislation on this 
matter. Thus, an apposite positioning of transnational collective negotiations in the 
system of European industrial relations will probably be determined by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The reason for this is the fact that it seems that the lack of a 
legal framework for a valid conclusion of transnational collective agreements is already 
generating serious legal problems affecting not only employees but also companies 
carrying out international business activities. Presently before the ECJ, the case of a 
Latvian company Laval (Vaxholm)13 is being ruled with an outcome expected soon 
(for details refer for instance to Clauwaert/Warneck 2006). In this case the European 
Court needs to answer the question of whether, in the absence of relevant legislation 
at the EU level, national industrial relations systems allowing application of different 
standards set by collective agreements to different groups of employees do not in-
fringe the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality on the one hand, 
and the freedom to provide services on the other (ibid.). The second question raised 
by the Laval case concerns the predominance of domestic collective agreements over 
foreign ones applicable to employees of foreign companies working in another state 
(for further reference see Ahlberg/Bruun/Mamlberg 2006: 155). The ECJ will have to 
clarify whether such a situation is or is not contrary to the EU prohibition of discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality. Questions of similar importance referring to the 
hierarchy and balance between EC social policy and EC economic policy (freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services) were raised in the Viking case. This 
lawsuit, also pending ruling by the ECJ, will provide very important impulses and 
guidelines for the future shape of an equal footing between economic freedoms and 
employee rights of workers (for further reference see Blanke 2006: 251). 
EWC Directive 94/45/EC and EWCs’ entitlement to engage into TCB 
The central problem with the concept of an optional legal framework supplementing 
existing levels of collective bargaining seems to be its proper positioning in various 
respects. There are many practical questions that need to be decided by the Commis-
sion before any consultation with the social partners takes place. Seemingly, the most 
important one has already been touched upon in this paper and concerns the actors 
eligible to conduct transnational collective negotiations and conclude the relevant 
agreements. A reading of EWC Directive 94/45/EC, especially Art. 1 (a) of the An-
nex ‘Subsidiary requirements’, will lead to the immediate discovery that ”The competence 
of European Works Councils shall be limited to information and consultation (…)”. One can of 
course try to interpret this provision by arguing that EWCs, when negotiating and 
signing transnational collective agreements, are in fact exercising an advanced and very 
effective form of consultation; such reasoning ignores, however, the teleological inter-
                                                          
13  C-341/05. 
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pretation of the Community legislator’s intention, namely that the competence of 
EWCs should remain confined to these two explicitly mentioned functions. As has 
been argued earlier in the paper, consultation is not identical with negotiation. Regard-
ing the latter, as far as EWCs are concerned, the question of their sufficient mandate 
emerges, too. Firstly, as already mentioned, they were intended to perform informa-
tion exchange and consultation and it was for these purposes that the delegates at 
individual sites were elected. If now the same delegates sign agreements modifying 
working conditions and sometimes even the work contracts of individual employees, 
the reproach of a lack of legitimacy for such actions automatically arises. This charge 
becomes even more serious and valid in a situation where such EWC members ap-
prove accords with company management that, in consequence, have binding effects 
on employees of the company who were not involved in the election of these EWC 
delegates, or where EWC composition is not based on the principle of proportional-
ity. Such a situation takes place in cases where a certain subsidiary is not made part of 
the information and consultation procedure in the company (no entitlement to send 
delegates to EWC), or is only passively (receptively) participating in this procedure. 
Such a constellation is acceptable as long as information and consultation is con-
cerned, but not when co-determination is at stake. Additionally, one needs to take into 
account the effect which an announcement of elections for delegates to an informa-
tion and consultation body would have on their turnout compared to the impact that 
would be exerted by a similar announcement, but about voting for members of a body 
with co-determination competencies. Arguably, the turnout in the latter case could be 
much higher than in the former situation. 
Secondly, EWCs are not trade union bodies and collective bargaining, as we 
know it on the national level, has always been a domain of trade unions. The reason 
for exclusive mandate of trade unions has always been their specific authorization 
which they possess entitling them to represent the interests of employees, especially in 
situations which require involving into binding commitments recognised by law. In 
the EWC Directive 94/45/EC, however, there is no recognition of either trade unions 
or their organisations on the European level (e.g. EIFs), which strengthens the argu-
ments of opponents of extending EWCs’ rights to a mandate for conducting transna-
tional collective negotiations. A way of breaking this deadlock and adding legitimacy 
to the existent transnational agreements could be an imposition of a requirement to 
have them ratified or co-signed by national trade unions in countries in which they are 
implemented.  
Yet EWCs are not the only ‘problematic’ actors in the whole set up. It is also un-
clear who shall negotiate on the side of labour world: the European Industry Federa-
tions (EIFs) who have a mandate in the European sectoral dialogue, or maybe the 
already mentioned national trade unions who were hitherto involved in negotiations 
on company echelon? EIFs seem better equipped to perform this function due to 
their European background and resources; yet national trade unions have been tradi-
tionally involved in collective bargaining on the corporate level in individual Member 
States. One of the big questions is how to reconcile these stakeholders and appoint 
the one likely to be best equipped to perform these functions. Recognising this over-
lapping of competencies and its significance for the success of the introduction of 
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transnational collective bargaining, the study group’s proposal for an optional legal 
framework recommends establishment of joint negotiating bodies; these organs could 
consist of representatives of various parties or even stakeholders, including EIFs, 
trade unions and EWCs. 
Similar questions apply to the side of management. Confusion about who should 
negotiate such transnational collective agreements for employers, with all its conse-
quences, also needs to be dissipated. Whether it will be managers of a particular com-
pany only, or whether they will be represented or assisted by employers’ organisations 
such as Business Europe (former UNICE) for instance and/or national organisations, 
remains to be decided.  
An answer to some of these questions was provided by the research group of 
Prof. E. Ales which supplied a clear definition of the roles of the parties concerned. 
According to this concept EWCs would have the task and competence of assisting in 
triggering off procedures for collective bargaining, though without the mandate to 
unilaterally start and engage in transnational negotiations with management. EWCs, 
after obtaining a mandate from European trade union organisations which would be 
involved in transnational negotiations from their very beginning, would initiate talks 
with the company management by obtaining the necessary information. Subsequently, 
the task of negotiating binding agreements would be performed by European trade 
union organisations (i.e. for instance EIFs). The latter would also have the mandate to 
initiate transnational negotiations unilaterally.  
Turning to legal facets of the proposed supplementary framework, one needs to 
ask about the hierarchy and status of these acts. Shall they have predominance over 
national collective agreements? If not, then another question emerges concerning, 
notably, whether it will be possible to guarantee that these transnational accords re-
spect national collective agreements in all the countries to which they apply. The next 
question to arise is that of implementation: will the transnational agreements be di-
rectly applicable to all signatory parties, or will there be any transposition measures 
necessary to ensure their binding effect? In the view of the study group, such agree-
ments would be deprived of the quality of automatically binding power and would be 
granted this attribute indirectly via an implementation by unilateral managerial deci-
sions adopted by all national subsidiaries. From the perspective of a balanced footing 
of contractual parties, such an approach discriminates against the labour side parties 
by putting them below par in comparison to managers. As such, the proposal of this 
particular solution represents a weakness of the whole concept, which could be simpli-
fied and made clearer by granting such agreements legal force without any transposi-
tion measures. 
Furthermore, in order to safeguard proper implementation and good quality of 
application of these agreements, questions of legal enforcement, monitoring, dispute 
resolution and recourse to independent courts at the relevant level must be clarified. 
First of all the monitoring mechanism, which would help identify malfunctions and 
abuses or breaches of transnational agreements, should be defined. Further, in case of 
legal conflicts, procedures for their resolution before courts would have to be laid 
down. At this point the question of court jurisdiction concerning a choice between 
either the competence of national labour courts or the ECJ (at least as a last instance 
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for interpretation) would have to be answered. All these questions still remain unan-
swered (except for the unquestionable general competence of the ECJ to decide in 
cases involving interpretation of the acquis). Similarly, the report of the study group 
includes no clear concept of enforcement measures. This question has to be ad-
dressed, most importantly, in regard to the appropriate level on which enforcement 
should take place. Rumour has it that the initial draft of the Communication from the 
Commission “Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe”, announcing the study on 
transnational collective bargaining, included provisions on procedures designed for 
transnational dispute settlement, but that, as a result of heavy lobbying from employer 
organisations, this point was deleted from the commission for a study (Clauwaert/ 
Warneck 2006). 
Conclusions 
From the above analysis several inferences can be drawn. Firstly, the answer to the 
leading question whether EWCs’ involvement in conclusion of transnational collective 
agreements should be viewed as a positive functional development or rather as ille-
gitimate trespassing on the turf of trade unions or their organisations is in both as-
pects affirmative. EWCs’ engagement in this form of co-determination or co-
management should indeed be perceived as a positive advancement of the efficacy of 
their work. EWCs have often been criticised for their reactive mode of operation and 
hence, if they try to move on to the active side, they should not be condemned again, 
so that they are not confronted with contradictory signals. At the same time, if they 
enhance the scope of their work, they should not do so without an appropriate legal 
basis and mandate from their constituencies, i.e. employees. As long as there is no 
legal framework for transnational collective negotiations, EWCs, when engaging in 
this field of activity, will be running on the verge of legality, as they were created and 
designed to perform information and consultation functions. At the same time, this 
advancement of EWCs’ operation stemming, on the one hand, from their extensive 
know-how accrued over many years and, on the other hand, from the permanent 
process of restructuring characterising the current economy, should be seen as a func-
tional development aiming at filling a certain vacuum. In this context, it should be 
clearly stated that EWCs do have an important role to play in supporting transnational 
collective negotiations. This drive at creating a new level of collective negotiations can 
be viewed from the perspective of the concept of neo-functionalism known in politi-
cal science by the motto ‘forms follow functions’ (See for instance Haas 1976; Mitrany 
1975: 25-37). According to the logics of neo-functionalism, once the practical devel-
opment has taken place and become established, an institutional superstructure should 
follow in order to accommodate the change. Therefore there is a need for a legal 
framework for transnational collective bargaining/negotiations. As has been argued, 
one finds ample ties for anchoring such a legal frame in the current acquis .The bonds 
currently available are, however, insufficient to avoid: a) overlapping of transnational 
collective negotiations with their national counterpart, company level bargaining and 
the European sectoral social dialogue; b) consequent overlapping of competence be-
tween actors, thereby generating a potential for clashes between various social part-
ners. Similarly, current legislation is deficient in terms of proper enforcement, imple-
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mentation, hierarchy and conflict settlement of the transnational collective agree-
ments. Since, due to contradictory opinions of the labour world and the employers’ 
organisations, there is little chance that they will be able to settle this issue by means 
of self-regulation, the European Commission should carry out the initiative of estab-
lishing the European echelon of collective bargaining at company level. Such legisla-
tion would indeed contribute to the improved operation of the common market and 
would follow the obvious need expressed by practical developments. This should not 
happen, however, before the review of the EWC Directive 94/45/EC has been com-
pleted and amendments aimed at closing the loopholes and securing the correct exer-
cise of information and consultation rights in their proper form have been imple-
mented14. Only then will all EWCs have the necessary capacities guaranteed by law 
enabling them to support national trade unions and their European organisations in 
efficacious collective negotiations across the borders. 
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